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INSURANCE
During the survey period 21 cases of importance involving
insurance contracts and the insurance statutes were decided
by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the federal district
courts sitting in South Carolina, and the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals.' Of particular importance is St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Boykin,2 in which the South Carolina
Supreme Court refused to follow Clouse v. American Mutual
Liability Insurance Co.,3 a federal case dealing with the re-
lationship between automobile liability insurance coverage and
the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing
Act. Since under the Erie doctrine this state court case had
the effect of overruling Clouse, one of the coverage questions
which frequently arose in settlement negotiations has been
resolved.
Decisions which are applicable to insurance law in general
have been categorized according to subject matter; other cases
have been categorized according to the type of insurance in-
volved. Names of insurance companies have been abbreviated
throughout the text.
I. APPLICATION FOR INSURANCE
Avoidance of Policy for Fraud. It is basic contracts law that
fraud on the part of one party in the formation of the contract
renders the contract voidable at the option of the party de-
frauded. 4 In insurance contracts the question of fraud most
often arises when false information has been given, or in-
formation has been concealed, by the insured in completing
the questionnaire which is normally part of the application
for insurance. A rather strict rule has developed in this
1. Gambrell v. Cox, 250 S.C. 228, 157 S.E.2d 233 (1967), although in-
volving an insurance company, is discussed in detail in the Contracts and
Practice and Procedure sections of this survey. In Bruce v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 277 F. Supp. 439 (D.S.C. 1967), the federal district
court held that the insured's failure to give the insurer notice of cemetery
desecration suits filed against him until almost two years after the com-
plaints had been served relieved the insurer of liability under the standard
notice provision in the clause. The court stated that the insurer need not
show prejudice by virtue of not having received notice.
2. 161 S.E.2d 818 (S.C. 1968). This case is discussed under the
heading Liability Insurance in Section V of this article.
3. 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965).
4. 1 A. CoRuIN, CONTACTS § 6 (1963).
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special area of contracts law, restricting the ability of an
insurance company to avoid a policy for fraud:
[I]n order to void a policy of insurance on the ground
that the fraudulant representations were made in the
procuring of such policy, the burden of proof rests
upon the insurer to show, by clear and convincing
evidence, not only that the statements complained
of were untrue, but in addition thereto that their
falsity was known to the applicant, that they were
material to the risk, were relied on by the insurer,
and that they were made with intent to deceive and
defraud the company.5
This rule was applied in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Ausbarn,6 in which Southern Farm brought
a declaratory judgment action to determine its liability under
a binder issued to Ausborn, who had been involved in an auto-
mobile accident on March 10, 1965.7
Ausborn obtained a liability policy on January 27, 1965,
when he purchased a new automobile, but on February 7, 1965,
this policy was cancelled by the insurer. After several unsuc-
cessful attempts to obtain another policy, Ausborn, with the
help of the dealer from whom he had purchased the car, con-
tacted Southern Farm's agent and completed an application
for insurance as follows:
Q. Has any driver been arrested or convicted of
any traffic violation during the past 3 years?
A. No.
Q. Has operator's license for any driver ever been
suspended or revoked?
A. No.
Q. Has insurance for any driver ever been cancelled,
declined or refused?
5. Smiley v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 249 S.C. 461, 464,
154 S.E.2d 834, 835-36 (1967).
6. 249 S.C. 627, 155 S.E.2d 902 (1967).
7. Ausborn was a defendant in three separate tort actions brought
by members of the Hughey family. After the wife and child had recovered
actual and punitive damages in their separate suits, the husband brought
an action for medical expenses, loss of consortium, and punitive damages.
On appeal the supreme court held that punitive damages could not be
awarded in a loss of consortium suit. Hughey v. Ausborn, 249 S.C. 470,
154 S.E.2d 839 (1967); see Comment, 19 S.C.L. Rv. 871 (1967).
1968]
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A. No.
On the strength of the answers in this questionnaire, a binder
was issued, which Ausborn contended provided coverage for
the March 10 accident. 8
It was undisputed that the answers given in the question-
naire were false since there were several traffic violations
by Ausborn recorded in the South Carolina Highway Depart-
ment records, his driver's license had been revoked, and the
previous liability policy issued to him had been cancelled.9
The trial judge had made the following findings: (1) that
Ausborn had told Southern Farm's agent of his August 22,
1963, conviction for reckless driving, which resulted in a li-
cense suspension for four months, and that this knowledge
of the agent was imputable to the company; (2) that Aus-
born's other traffic violations did not technically result in
"convictions," as that word was used in the policy, since he
had not contested these offenses, but had merely forfeited
bond; (3) that Southern Farm should be charged with notice
of Ausborn's traffic violations since it knew of the reckless
driving conviction and the resulting driver's license suspen-
sion for four months and since section 46-342 of the South
Carolina Code provides for a revocation of driver's license
8. The party more concerned than Ausborn with the present proceed-
ings was State Farm Mutual Automobile Liability Insurance Company,
who was the tort plaintiffs' uninsured motorist carrier. It was stipulated
that if the appellant was successful in this appeal, State Farm would be
required to reimburse Southern Farm for the costs of defending the tort
actions against Ausborn and to pay the judgments which had been ob-
tained against him. See note 7 supra.
9. The falsity of the answers is clear from the court's summary of
the defendant's driving record:
The evidence shows, according to the South Carolina State
Highway Department records, that the respondent was charged
with and convicted of speeding on May 20, 1963, again on June
16, 1963, with reckless driving on August 22, 1963, for which
his driver's license was suspended for four months, beginning
November 22, 1963, again for speeding on September 24, 1963,
again on September 7, 1964, and was charged with failing to
yield right of way on September 8, 1964, at which time his
driver's license was suspended for two months, beginning
October 13, 1964, and again with speeding on October 21, 1964.
The record also shows that the respondent's license to drive a
motor vehicle was suspended on December 17, 1964, because
of the cancellation of his insurance under the Safety Responsi-
bility Act. Additionally the records from the Greenville Police
Department, pertaining to the respondent, show that on June
30, 1963, and on October 21, 1964, he paid fines for driving too
fast for conditions.
249 S.C. at 634, 155 S.E.2d at 906.
[Vol. 20
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only for a second offense and then only for three months;
(4) that Ausborn's demeanor should have put Southern Farm
on inquiry notice of his driving record; and (5) that since
Ausborn had bought the car on January 27 but had not ap-
plied for the policy until February 27, Southern Farm must
have known that a prior policy had been cancelled.
The trial judge held that because of Southern Farm's
knowledge or notice that the answers in the questionnaire
were false, it was estopped to assert the defendant's fraud
as a grounds for avoidance. Moreover, the lower court held
that because of Southern Farm's knowledge it could not claim
to have relied upon the questionnaire in issuing the binder,
as required by the rule quoted above.
The supreme court held that the trial judge's finding that
Ausborn had told Southern Farm's agent of his reckless driv-
ing conviction was not clearly erroneous, but that the trial
judge's interpretation of the word "conviction" was clearly
erroneous. The court found justification for its decision in
several South Carolina statutes which provide that for-
feiture of bond for the various traffic violations in Aus-
born's record had the effect of a "conviction."' 1 The finding
that knowledge of Ausborn's conviction for reckless driving
and license suspension was sufficient to charge Southern
Farm with knowledge of the other traffic offenses was
found to be erroneous since some of the violations took place
after Ausborn's license had been suspended.
The finding that Ausborn's demeanor was sufficient to
put Southern Farm on notice that the answers in the ques-
tionnaire might have been false was held to be erroneous on
two grounds: Ausborn's demeanor in the court room was
not evidence of his demeanor 141/ months ago when the
questionnaire was completed, and it was inconsistent for the
trial judge to find all of Ausborn's testimony credible if his
demeanor had been such as to put Southern Farm on notice.
The finding that the passage of time between Ausborn's pur-
chase of the new car and his application for insurance was
notice to Southern Farm of a previous cancellation by another
insurer was summarily dismissed as clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, the supreme court concluded that Southern
Farm had sustained its burden of persuasion by clear and
10. S.C. COD ANN. §§ 46-195, -346, -702(1) (1962).
19681
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss4/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEw
convincing evidence that the answers in the questionnaire
were false and were given with the intent to defraud the
company, and that the misrepresentations made by Ausborn
were material to the risk and were relied upon by the com-
pany.
II. CANCELLATION
Cancellation Notice by Insurer. Most insurance policies
contain provisions under which either party may bring the
contract to an end at his option by complying with certain
conditions precedent." These conditions have been the sub-
ject of a wealth of litigation growing out of the situation in
which the insurance company claims to have cancelled the
policy before loss occurred, but failed to return unearned
premiums. The insurance companies lost in most of the earlier
litigation since the courts generally construed the older can-
cellation provisions as requiring a tender of unearned pre-
miums before the contract could be successfully terminated
by the insurer.12 Apparently in response to these decisions,
11. Of course, aside from the cancellation provisions of the policy,
the contract may be rescinded by mutual consent of the parties under
basic contracts law. Dill v. Lumbermen's Mut. Ins. Co., 213 S.C. 593, 50
S.E.2d 923 (1948).
12. See generally Annot., 127 A.L.R. 1341 (1940), supplemented, 16
A.L.R.2d 1200 (1951). In earlier cases the South Carolina court followed
the rule that the then standard cancellation clause in automobile collision
policies required a tender of unearned premiums as a condition precedent
to cancellation by the insurer. Crotts v. Fletcher Motor Co., 219 S.C. 204,
64 S.E.2d 540 (1951). See also Rice v. American Security Ins. Co., 222
S.C. 463, 73 S.E.2d 683 (1952) (applying the Crotts construction); Elmore
v. Middlesex Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 219 S.C. 520, 65 S.E.2d 871 (1951) (ap-
plying the Crotts construction). The clause involved in these cases had
received an extremely strained construction. A more realistic basis for
the decisions holding tender a condition precedent was given by Mr. Justice
Cothran in Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corp. v. Boston Ins. Co., 133 S.C.
472, 482-83, 131 S.E. 22, 26 (1925):
These decisions construing as they do the old form, as to
which there may have been some ground for doubting that
the return of the unearned premium was so linked up with the
notice of cancellation as to constitute it a concurrent condition
precedent, are based upon the ground that a party to a con-tract, having performed his part of it, and acquired valuable
rights under it, cannot be subject to a rescission of the contract
at the pleasure of the other by his merely giving notice of his
determination to cancel it, without at the same time tendering
the return of what he has received by reason of the contract.
An interesting twist occurred in Herndon v. Continental Cas. Co., 144
S.C. 448, 142 S.E. 648 (1928), in which the plaintiff alleged that the
insurance company "willfully, fraudulently, and unlawfully, with intent
to cheat and defraud" continued to collect premiums after it had cancelled
the policy. The court held that a demurrer should have been granted on
the grounds that the alleged cancellation was ineffective. Unearned
p~remiums had not been tendered, so the policy was still in force and
collection of premiums could not have been fraudulent.
[Vol. 20
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many insurance companies drafted clauses which allow al-
ternative means of cancellation. Under such a clause the in-
surance company can either tender unearned premiums with
the notice of cancellation or can simply give notice of cancel-
lation which states that a premium settlement will be made.18
These new cancellation clauses were upheld by the South
Carolina court,14 but in Allied Concord Financial Corp. v.
Sterling Insurance Co.,15 the court made it clear that strict
compliance on the part of the insurance company with the
conditions described in such a clause is necessary for cancel-
lation to be effective. In this case the fire insurance policy
in question, under which loss was payable to the mortgagee
of the insured premises, contained a cancellation clause which
provided that "notice of cancellation shall state that said
excess premium (if not tendered) will be refunded on de-
mand"
The policy was issued by Sterling on May 31, 1963, and the
premium was paid for a full three years' coverage. On No-
vember 25, 1965, the insured residence was destroyed by fire.
Earlier, on August 26, 1964, notice of cancellation had been
sent to the plaintiff mortgagee which stated only that "pre-
mium adjustment will be made as soon as practicable after
cancellation becomes effective." In an action on the policy by
13. Such a "new form" was compared with an "old form" in Hamilton
Ridge Lumber Corp. v. Boston Ins. Co., 133 S.C. 472, 131 S.E. 22 (1925),
and a good analysis of the alternatives under the "new form" was made
by Mr. Justice Cothran. This ease also illustrates one of the difficulties
insurance companies have with the tender condition. The company failed
to comply with the notice alternative under the "new form" but did
remit its check "representing the return premiums" under the tender
alternative. The amount of unearned premium due, however, was mis-
calculated by the company, so the attempted cancellation was held in-
effective. This case seems to be a rather harsh one, but the company
could have avoided this loss by complying with the notice alternative
rather than attempting a simultaneous return of premiums.
14. The insurance companies avoided Crotts v. Fletcher Motor Co., 219
S.C. 204, 64 S.E.2d 540 (1951), and the cases following it (note 12 supra)
by adding the clause "but payment or tender of unearned premium is not
a condition of cancellation." McElmurray v. American Fidelity Ins. Co.,
236 S.C. 195, 113 S.E.2d 528 (1960). See also Nance v. Blue Ridge Ins.
Co., 238 S.C. 471, 120 S.E.2d 516 (1961); Moore v. Palmetto Bank &
Textile Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 341, 120 S.E.2d 231 (1961). In McElmurray v.
American Fidelity Ins. Co., supra, leave was given the appellant to ask
the court to overrule the three earlier cases holding a return of unearned
premiums to be a condition precedent to cancellation by the insurer
(note 12 supra), but such steps did not have to be taken in view of the
additional clause added to the cancellation provision, which caused this
case to be distinguishable from the earlier decisions.
15. 159 S.E.2d 919 (1968).
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the mortgagee, the court held that the notice of cancellation
was ineffective since it did not state "that said excess
premium (if not tendered) will be refunded on demand," as
required by the policy,16 and that the policy was thus in
effect when the premises was destroyed by fire.17
On the basis of this case insurance companies would be
well advised to be wary of form cancellation notices since
the various policies issued by the company may contain dif-
ferent notice requirements.1 8 It should also be noted that
a return of unearned premium simultaneously with the can-
cellation notice may not provide an effective cushion in case
of a defective notice since the amount of premium due may
be in dispute or may have been erroneously calculated.1 9
III. FIRE INSURANCE
Public and Institutional Property Plan: Replacement Cost
Endorsement. The most complex case decided during the sur-
vey period, Columbia, College v. Pennsylvania Insurance Co.,20
involved a construction of fire insurance policies issued pur-
suant to the South Carolina Public and Institutional Property
16. It should be noted that the wording used by the company in its
notice was taken from the standard cancellation provision but not from
that part of the cancellation provision which sets out the contents of the
notice. For example, see the cancellation provision quoted in Nance v.
Blue Ridge Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 471, 473, 120 S.E.2d 516, 517 (1961).
17. The court's rather technical approach and the seemingly harsh
result in this case were virtually required by the holding in Hamilton
Ridge Lumber Corp. v. Boston Ins. Co., 133 S.C. 472, 131 S.E.2d 22 (1925),
discussed supyra note 13. It would seem that strict compliance is a neces-
sary requirement since it would be impractical and productive of litiga-
tion for the court to attempt to draw a line somewhere between strict
compliance and non-compliance. Likewise, it should be remembered that
the insurance company, not the insured, drafts the policy provisions, or
in the words of Ir. Justice Cothran:
It may safely be assumed that this modification of the can-
cellation clause prepared by insurance companies was in-
tended to secure some benefit to them. It was a stage in the
evolution of policy contracts, constantly tightened as experi-
ence or judicial interpretation suggested; a course of action
not at all the subject of unfavorable criticism, for it was
clearly within their rights, but which, in the unequal contest,
has inclined the Courts, in all questions of construction, to
favor the interests of the insured.
Id. at 480, 131 S.E. at 25.
18. Compare the notice requirements of the policy involved in the
principal case with those of the policy involved in Nance v. Blue Ridge
Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 471, 120 S.E.2d 516 (1961) (combination liability colli-
sion policy).
19. See Hamilton Ridge Lumber Corp. v. Boston Ins. Co., 133 S.C. 472,
181 S.E. 22 (1925). This case is discussed supra note 13.
20. 250 S.C. 237, 157 S.E.2d 416 (1967).
[Vol. 20
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Plan, a comprehensive and sophisticated insurance plan for
public institutions, overseen by the South Carolina Inspection
and Rating Bureau and the Insurance Commissioner. 21 Nor-
mally such a plan comprehends several insurance companies,
but under Columbia College's plan, there was only one in-
surance company, which issued eight separate policies. The
total face amount of these policies was increased by endorse-
ment to $3,094,200, each policy providing a pro rata share
of coverage for the period from March 25, 1961, to March 25,
1964.
During February 1964 two buildings on the Columbia Col-
lege campus were completely destroyed by fire. The value
of these buildings was recited in the valuation clause (form
882) attached to the policies as $550,000 and $200,000 re-
spectively. The insurance company paid the college the agreed
value of $750,000.
The college then brought suit on the policies seeking to
recover the difference between $1,355,736, the total cost of
replacing the destroyed buildings, and $750,000, the amount
paid by the insurer. After a second amended complaint was
served, the defendant demurred on the grounds that under
the terms of the policies, $750,000 constituted the whole of
its liability. The demurrer was sustained, and the plaintiff
appealed.
The following documents, among others, were attached to
the standard South Carolina insuring agreement in each of
the eight policies issued by the defendant: (1) Public and
Institutional Property Form (P.I. Form No. 1),22 (2) Valua-
21. The plan was submitted to the Insurance Commissioner in 1960
pursuant to S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-674 (1962).
22. This form provided in part:
SECTION I
(A) [$3,094,200 (total of all eight policies)] on all property
of every description (except as otherwise limited or excluded)
owned by the Insured, including architects fees, and on personal
property of others for which the Insured assumed liability
prior to loss, on the Insured's liability imposed by law for loss
to personal property of others and on the Insured's interest in
personal property belonging in whole or in part to others ....
SECTION H
(A) In the determination of any loss under this policy caused
by the peril(s) insured against occurring after the inception
date of this policy and prior to [March 25, 1964], this ... Com-
pany shall not be liable for a greater proportion of any loss
than the amount of insurance under this policy bears to
$3,094,200.
19681
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tion Clause - South Carolina (No. 882),23 and (3) Public
and Institutional Property Replacement Cost Endorsement
(P.I. Form No. 4).24
Although, due to the complexity of the case, the parties'
theories as to how the contract should be construed do not
appear too clearly from the opinion, it would seem to have
been the insurer's position that the valuation form listing the
buildings as worth $750,000 was controlling in regard to the
amount of insurance coverage on these buildings. The valua-
tion clause specifically provided as follows: "The Insured
and the Insurer hereby agree that the value of the buildings
described herein is - and hereby fix the amount of insur-
ance to be carried thereon (including this policy) - re-
pectively as follows ... ." The values are listed as $550,000
and $200,000 respectively on the two buildings destroyed.
The insurer also argued that the replacement cost endorse-
ment did not affect the valuation clause. Section five of this
endorsement provided as follows:
(5) This company's liability for loss under this policy
including this endorsement shall not exceed the small-
est of the following amounts (a), (b), or (c) :
(a) The amount of this policy applicable to the
damages or destroyed property;
(b) The replacement cost of the property to which
this endorsement applies, or any part thereof, identi-
cal with such property on the same premises and in-
tended for the same occupancy and use;
(c) The amount actually and necessarily expended
in repairing or replacing such property or any part
thereof.
The insurer reasoned that section 5(a) limited its liability
under the endorsement to that fixed in the valuation clause,
23. This form provided in part:
Insurance under this policy is effected subject to the following
agreements and provisions:
VALUATION CLAUSE-The Insured and the Insurer hereby
agree that the value of buildings described herein is-and here-
by fix the amount of insurance to be carried thereon (includ-
ing this poliey) respectively, as follows:
AGREED VALUE OF BUILDINGS
Building No. 1, $550,000.00
Building No. 3, $200,000.00.
24. The pertinent provisions of the replacement cost endorsement are
quoted in the next paragraph of the text.
598 [Vol. 20
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while sections 5 (b) and 5 (c) provided replacement cost cov-
erage on personal property for which there was no valuation.
The court rejected this analysis by the insurer in favor of
the construction offered by the plaintiff. The valuation
clause could be accounted for under sections 37-154 and
37-155 of the South Carolina Code. 5 These sections read
together would seem to require a valuation clause in the
policy even when a replacement cost endorsement is added.
Section 37-155 specifically provides that
riders or endorsements may, in consideration of an
adequate premium or premium deposit, be attached
to policies insuring property, indemnifying the in-
sured for the difference between the actual value
stated in the policy and the amount actually expended
to repair, rebuild or replace with new materials of
like size, kind and quality such insured property as
has been damaged or destroyed by fire or other perils
insured against.26
Section 5(a) of the replacement cost endorsement, relied
upon by the insurer, could be reasonably construed as ap-
plying to the $3,094,200 figure (as increased by endorsement)
in section I1(A) of the public and institutional property
form number one.27 Thus, in no event was the insurer ob-
ligated to pay any more than the face amount of the eight
policies under section 5 (a), no matter what replacement cost
might be, but under sections 5(b) and 5(c) the insurer was
obligated to pay replacement cost for any amount under the
face amount given in section II(a).28
25. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-154 (1962) provides in part:
No company writing fire insurance policies, doing business in
this State, shall issue a policy for more than the value stated
in the policy or the value of the property to be insured, theamount of insurance to be fixed by the insurer and insured at
or before the time of issuing the policy.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-155 (1962) is quoted in the text which follows.26. Emphasis added.
27. Section II(A) of this form is set out in note 22 supr.8 The court also found s me comfort in the fact that the public and
institutional property form number one provided 'blanket coverage;" theterm "blanket" was indicated on the endorsement-general (form no.
282), used from time to time to increase the face amount of the policies
and to extend the expiration date. A schedule conversion endorsement
(P2. Fo 2) was available to the parties to convert the blanket
coverage of the basic public and institutional property form to specific
coverage on items to be listed as part of this endorsement. The court
found that use of the term blanket coverage in the endorsements and use
1968] 599
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IV. LIFE, ACCIDENT, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
A. Insurable Interest
In Foster v. United Insurance Co. of America29 the court
held a life policy void for lack of insurable interest. The
policy had been procured by the beneficiary on the life of
a friend to whom the beneficiary was apparently not related.
Moreover, the beneficiary was not obligated to pay the friend's
funeral expenses, and the friend had no knowledge of the
policy.
B. Exclusions
Death from Disease. In an action to recover death benefits
under an accident policy, the burden of producing evidence
of accidental death is initially upon the plaintiff, and the
burden of persuasion on this issue remains upon the plaintiff
throughout the trial. 0 If the insurer has answered affirm-
atively that the alleged accident came within an exclusionary
clause of the policy, the burden of producing evidence of this
fact is initially upon the insurer, and the burden of persuasion
on this issue remains upon the insurer. 1
In Gamble v. Travelers Insurance Co.32 the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff had met his persuasion burden as
a matter of law on the issue of the insured's death by accident,
while the insurer had failed to meet his initial burden of
producing evidence that the accident came within the exclu-
sionary clause of the policy. Thus, the supreme court affirmed
the lower court's judgment for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff brought this action as beneficiary under a
group life-accident policy issued by the defendant. The in-
sured was 39 years of age and worked at a filling station.
On several occasions he had fallen and dislocated his jaw
while at work. On April 26, 1965, the insured fell in his
back yard and was taken to the hospital with a dislocated
of the basic form providing blanket coverage without the conversion en-
dorsement were indicative of the parties' overall intent to secure a
fluctuating coverage for the whole class of insured property rather than
a specific coverage as outlined in the valuation clause.
29. 158 S.E.2d 201 (S.C. 1967).
30. See Coleman v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 384, 128
S.E.2d 699 (1962).
31. See Outlaw v. Calhoun Life Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 199, 119 S.E.2d 685
(1961).
32. 160 S.E.2d 523 (S.C. 1968).
[Vol. 20
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jaw. After the jaw had been corrected, the patient fell in
the hospital corridor, dislocated his jaw again, and began to
have a strong Jacksonian seizure, described as a convulsion
involving arms, legs, and tongue.33 The convulsions continued
into the night with death occurring the next day. An autopsy
was performed, revealing the direct cause of death as inter-
cranial pressure from a large hematoma caused by a skull
fracture of recent origin.
On the issue of accidental death, the court interpreted
White v. North Carolina Mutual Life Insurance Co.84 as stand-
ing for the proposition that if the beneficiary proves that
death of the insured was caused by violent external means,
the presumption of accidental death arises, shifting the burden
of producing contrary evidence to the insurer. Since the de-
fendant did not produce any contrary evidence in this case,
the presumption was not overcome, and the plaintiff sustained
his persuasion burden as a matter of law.
The insurer's affirmative defense was based on an exclu-
sionary clause of the policy which provided: "The insurance
under this Part shall not cover any loss (1) caused or con-
tributed to by bodily or mental infirmity, disease or infec-
tion.. ., even though the proximate and precipitating cause
of the loss is accidental bodily injury . . . ." The defendant's
theory was that the insured's having fallen and dislocated
his jaw on several occasions, coupled with the fact that he
fell in the hospital corridor and experienced severe convul-
sion, was sufficient evidence to sustain his persuasion burden
as a matter of law that the insured's death was "contributed
to by bodily or mental infirmity," probably epilepsy, marked
by falling, convulsion, and dislocation of the jaw.
Although her testimony was not clear, there was some sug-
gestion on the part of the insured's wife that the prior falls
were accompanied by convulsion, 5 and there was also evi-
dence that when a relaxant was given the insured in the
hospital corridor immediately after his fall there, his jaw
slipped back into place automatically,36 suggesting that prior
dislocations were the result of prior seizures.
33. Record at 18.
34. 208 S.C. 168, 37 SE.2d 505 (1946).
35. Record at 22-26.
36. Record at 44.
1968]
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The court concluded, however, that it was at least an equally
reasonable inference that the fall in the hospital and the ac-
companying convulsion were due to pressure from the hema-
toma formed as a result of a skull fracture sustained in the
prior fall on April 26, 1965. There was no direct evidence
that this prior fall was caused by any disease.3 7
Cardio-Vascular Disease. An exclusionary clause of the
hospitalization and surgical expense policy construed in Rey-
nolds v. Wabash Life Insurance Co.3 8 provided: "This policy
does not cover hospitalization due to cardio-vascular di-
sease .. unless such cause shall occur after the policy has
been maintained in continuous force for six (6) months from
date of issue." In this action brought by the beneficiary
against the insurer, it was undisputed that the insured died
from a ruptured abdominal aortic aneurysm less than six
months from the issuance of the policy.
An abdominal aortic aneurysm is a blister or weak spot
in the aorta at a point where this artery passes through the
abdomen. A rupture at this point causes internal bleeding
and is always fatal, unless possibly it is treated promptly
and vigorously. 9
The defendant contended that an abdominal aortic an-
eurysm is a "cardio-vascular disease" within the exclusionary
37. It is a fundamental principle of procedure that evidence which
supports an inference inconsistent with the proposition sought to be proved
equally with the desired inference is an insufficient production of evidence
as a matter of law. Ladson Motor Co. v. Croft, 212 Ga. 275, 92 S.E.2d
103 (1956). It would seem to be a more reasonable conclusion that the
circumstantial evidence adduced by the defendant on the question of
epilepsy or similar disease constituted a sufficient production of evidence
to make a jury question. In any event, the trial court did allow this issue
to go to the jury, so the supreme court's conclusion that a verdict should
have been directed for the plaintiff was dictum in view of the fact that
the jury found for the plaintiff.
38. 161 S.E.2d 168 (S.C. 1968).
39. Record at 20. In ScHrmID's ATroNnYs' DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE
63 (1965) the term aneurysm is defined as follows:
A sac-like dilation in an artery or a vein, usually the former,
as a result of a weakness in the wall of the structure and the
pressure of the blood within the artery. It may be visualized
as the bulge occasionally seen in an old garden hose when the
water is turned on.
The term aortic aneurysm is defined, id. at 63-64, as follows:
An aneurysm affecting the aorta, especially the first part of
the aorta. The aorta is the largest blood vessel or artery of
the body. It begins at the outlet of the heart (slightly to the
left of the center near the top), curves upward a short dis-
tance, makes a turn downward, and extends through the chest
to the abdomen ....
602 [Vol. 20
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clause of the policy. The plaintiff, on the other hand, argued
that an abdominal aortic aneurysm is a vascular disease only,
not a cardio-vascular disease, since it does not involve the
heart.4
0
An English professor, qualified as an expert, testified that
the hyphen between the words cardio and vascular functioned
as the conjunctive and, not the disjunctive or,41 requiring
the excluded disease to be both cardio and vascular. On this
issue the defendant produced medical testimony through
cross examination and direct examination that the term
"cardio-vascular," normally written "cardiovascular,1 42 is a
medical term of art comprehending any disease of either the
heart or the vascular system - that doctors do not think
of the two separately.43 These doctors also testified that in
their opinion an abdominal aortic aneurysm is a cardio-
vascular disease. 44
40. The term cardio means pertaining to the heart. B. MALOY, TnE
SIMPLIFIED MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 138 (3d ed. 1960). The term
vascular means pertaining to the blood vessels or arteries. SCHMIDT'S
ATTORNEYs' DICTIONARY op MDICINE 861 (1965).
41. Record at 16-17. Professor Welch demonstrated his skill with the
English language in the following colloquy between him and his former
student, the defendant's counsel.
Q. Dr. Welch, you are an English Professor, aren't you? Is
that correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You are not a Doctor, are you?
A. I am.
Q. Are you an M.D., sir?
A. Well, that depends, a Ph.D. was a Doctor before an M.D.
Q. But I asked you were you an M.D.
A. You didn't ask me that; you asked me if I was a Doctor
first.
Q. Well, I am not going to quarrel with you because obviously
you are much more adept at the language than I am, but I am
asking you, are you an M.D., sir?
A. I am not an M.D., sir.
Record at 17.
Although the record reveals that both trial counsel were skillful in pre-
senting evidence, the plaintiff's counsel, on one occasion, like the defend-
ant's counsel above, had his problems with esoteric issues and perceptive
witnessew as is illustrated by his direct examination of one of the medical
doctors:
Q And you have stated have you not, that this gentleman, Mr.
Arant [the insured], died as a result of the operation which
you performed?
A. Please, he died despite the operation.
Q. I mean-Excuse me, I am sure I made an error there. He
died, let's say, in spite of everything you could do for him.
Record at 23.
42. Record at 25-26.
43. Record at 24-25, 30.
44. Record at 25, 30.
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The lower court, however, adopted the plaintiff's theory
that cardio-vascular meant cardio and vascular so that the
insured's abdominal aortic aneurysm, a vascular disease only,
did not come within the exclusionary clause. The supreme
court affirmed, noting that ambiguities in an insurance con-
tract should be construed in favor of the insured.
45
V. AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
A. Collision Insurance
Conversion by Insurer. Although Lumpkin v. Allstate In-
surance Co.4 6 was an action for conversion under the law
of property, it is discussed in this article because of its
importance to collision insurers.
The defendant insurance company had issued its collision
policy to the plaintiff which provided $100 deductible cov-
erage for a 1964 Plymouth. On September 25, 1965, the
plaintiff was involved in a wreck which demolished the right
side of her car. The driver of a wrecker who approached
the scene offered to take the plaintiff's car to a body shop
in Seneca. In all the confusion no express objection was made
by the plaintiff, and the car was taken to Seneca.
On October 13, 1965, the defendant's adjuster went to the
body shop in Seneca and authorized repairs estimated at
$1,104.80. The adjuster did not talk with the plaintiff while
the car was being repaired, and the plaintiff never expressly
consented or objected to the repairs being made.47 The ad-
45. The defendant argued that while punctuation is an aid to arriving
at the intent of the parties, it is subordinate to a consideration of the
contract as a whole, as a means of ascertaining the parties' intent. Walker
v. Commercial Cas. Ins. Co., 191 S.C. 187, 4 S.E.2d 248 (1939). Although
the case was a difficult one to decide, the construction offered by the
defendant, based upon the medical definition of "cardiovascular," seemed
to be a sound one.
It should be noted that the supreme court did reduce substantially the
lower court's award of damages, which had been based upon a rather
strained construction of the policy.
46. 159 S.E.2d 852 (S.C. 1968).
47. On cross-examination the plaintiff testified as follows:
iQ. As a matter of fact, you went there two or three times dur-
ing the period of time that Mr. Hunnicutt was working on
your automobile, did you not?
A. I sure did.
Q. Did you tell Mr. Hunnicutt not to work on it, that you didn't
want the vehicle repaired?
A. No, sir, I did not tell him to start work on it, nor did I
tell him to stop it.
Q. You did not tell him to stop work on it?
[Vol. 20
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juster left a draft with the garageman for the cost of the
repairs less the $100 deductible. The draft contained the
typical provisions of an accord and satisfaction. A release
form was also left with the garageman, and he was instructed
not to turn over the car until this form had been signed.
The plaintiff did not sign either the release or the draft, but
she did pay the garageman $100.
The plaintiff brought suit alleging that the insurer had
converted her automobile. Her theory was that the defend-
ant made the signing of the accord and satisfaction and
release a condition to recovery of her car and that she
was not obligated to sign either. The jury returned a verdict
for $1300 actual damages and $3000 punitive damages based
upon the plaintiff's testimony that after repairs the car was
worth $1300.4 s The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
judgment for this amount.
On appeal the defendant contended that two essential ele-
ments of conversion had not been proved. On the one hand,
the defendant argued that it had never been in possession of
the car, that only the body shop had been in possession as
the plaintiff's bailee. Secondly, the defendant argued that
even if it had been in possession, there was still no conver-
sion since its possession was authorized under the policy for
purposes of repair and since the plaintiff had at least im-
pliedly consented to its possession and had never demanded a
return of the car.49
A. I did not tell him to stop work on it, nor did I tell him to
start work on it.
Q. But you went there and you saw that the work was being
performed?
A. After the work was started on it, which was about five
weeks or six after the car was wrecked was the first time that
I went to Sanders Body & Fender Shop.
Q. As a matter of fact, he called you and asked you to bring
the key down and you took it to him, didn't you?
A. That was in December.
Q. Well, you did take it to him, didn't you?
A. In December, yes, sir.
Record at 22. It would seem that the plaintiff's actions recounted above
amounted to at least an implied consent to having the body shop repair
the car.
48. The plaintiff also testified that the pre-accident value of the car
was $3000, which probably accounted for the amount of punitive damages
awarded by the jury.
49. The defendant principally relied upon Williams v. Haverty Furni-
ture Co., 182 S.C. 100, 188 S.E. 512 (1936); Roberts v. James, 160 S.C.
291, 158 S.E. 689 (1931). Brief for Appellant at 6, 8.
1968] 605
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On the first issue the court simply concluded that the
defendant took constructive possession of the car since the
garageman "who was clearly acting under the directions of
defendant with respect to the retention of the car, was at
least defendant's agent if not its bailee."50
The defendant's argument on the second issue was that
the plaintiff had always taken the position that she did not
want the repaired car back, but wanted another car, since
in her opinion the value of the car had depreciated sub-
stantially and it would be dangerous to drive. In particular,
the defendant argued that no demand had been made for a
return of the car as would be required for a conversion to
have taken place.51
To this argument the court simply answered that "[it is
unnecessary to review the evidence as to the unsuccessful
efforts of the plaintiff to obtain possesssion of her car,
without signing a full release, prior to the time she obtained
counsel."152 Under the policy the defendant's liability was
50. 159 S.E.2d at 854.
51. See Roberts v. James, 160 S.C. 291, 158 S.E. 689 (1931).
52. 159 S.E.2d at 854. With due deference to the court's analysis of
the record, it would seem that this conclusion was a hasty one. The
plaintiff did not testify on direct examination to having demanded a re-
turn of her car. On cross-examination she testified as follows:
Q. And did you tell M r. Hunnicutt on that occasion that you
didn't want that car?
A. That is exactly what I told him, that I didn't think I could
accept the car under the conditions.
Q. Did you tell him that you objected to the manner in which
it had been repaired in any particulars?
A. I said that I objected to the manner in which it was being
handled, and that the value of my car was not there, and I
could not afford to take it.
Q. And you told him that you didn't want that car because it
had been wrecked?
A. I did not say "because it had been wrecked," I said: be-
cause of the value of the car was not there I could not sign
for the car.
Q. And you made it clear to Mr. Hunnicutt then that you did
not want this car under the circumstances?
A. I made it clear that I did not want this car under the terms
that existed.
Q. You still don't want this car back, do you?
A. No, sir, will be honest with you, I don't want the car back,
because it might be something that will cause my life to be
taken from me, and it might be something that will take the
life of someone else, and I don't want this responsibility, sir.
Record at 23-24. The garageman likewise testified that the plaintiff had
made no demand for a return of her car. Record at 33-35. Under the
circumstances it would seem that there could be no cause of action for
conversion. Roberts v. James, 160 S.C. 291, 158 S.E. 689 (1931). The
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limited to "what it would cost to repair or replace the auto-
mobile or part with other of like kind or quality." The
court noted that under the circumstances, the insurer could
not require the plaintiff to sign a release in order to recover
the repaired vehicle if in fact the repairs had not been suf-
ficient to restore the pre-accident value of the car.58
Even though it is arguable whether or not an action for
conversion was proper under the circumstances,54 it is rather
clear that this suit could have been avoided if the insurer
had negotiated with the plaintiff concerning the repair or
replacement of her car prior to repairs having been made.
It would seem to have been unnecessary for the adjuster to
instruct the garageman not to return the car unless the
plaintiff signed a release, especially when it was not clear
whether the insurer had fully performed its obligation to
"repair or replace" the vehicle.
B. Uninsured Motorist Insurance
Effective Date of Statutory Requirement. In South Caro-
lina an uninsured motorist endorsement is now required in
every policy of automobile liability insurance issued in the
state.55 Under this endorsement the insurance company is
obligated to pay any judgment within the policy limits ob-
tained by its insured against an uninsured motorist.
The statute requiring an uninsured motorist endorsement
was enacted in 1959 to apply to policies "issued or delivered
after January 1, 1961. '' 56 In Lee v. Michigan Millers Mutual
Insurance Co.57 the court held that a policy issued prior to
this effective date did not have to contain an uninsured
motorist endorsement, notwithstanding an order of the Insur-
ance Commissioner apparently to the contrary.58
plaintiff's only possible cause of action would be on the insurance con-
tract to recover the difference between the pre-accident value of the
car and the value of the repaired vehicle, which was $1700 according to
the plaintiff's estimate. See Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 234 S.C.
583, 109 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
53. The court cited Campbell v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 234 S.C. 583,
109 S.E.2d 572 (1959).
54. See note 52 supra.
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1967).
56. LI S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 574 (No. 311 § 21(d), 1959).
57. 158 S.E.2d 774 (S.C. 1968).
58. The order of the Insurance Commissioner provided as follows:
It appearing that it will be to the best interest of the people
of this State that all policies of motor vehicle liability insur-
19681
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Contact Requirement. The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi-
bility Act provides that "[a] motor vehicle shall be deemed
to be uninsured if the owner or operator thereof be un-
known .... 1"9 Suit may be brought against the unknown
motorist as John Doe, and the plaintiff's uninsured motorist
carrier may defend in the name of John Doe.60 To avoid
the rather obvious problem of fraudulent suits based upon
the negligence of phantom drivers, the legislature enacted
a provision, typical in uninsured motorist laws, requiring,
as a condition to bringing a "John Doe suit" that "[t]he in-
jury or damage [be] caused by physical contact with the
unknown vehicle ... ,
ance, on January 1, 1961, contain the uninsured motorist provi-
sion as set forth in Section 46-750.23-1 of the South Carolina
Code of Laws, Now, Therefore, it is
Ordered, that every policy or contract of motor vehicle
liability insurance shall be construed to contain the endorse-
ment or provision as to uninsured motor vehicles as set forth
in Section 46-750.23-1 of the South Carolina Code of Laws, ef-
fective January 1, 1961.
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(3) (Supp. 1967).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.35 (Supp. 1967) provides:
If the owner or opreator of any vehicle causing injury or dam-ages by physical contact be unknown, an action may be in-
stituted against the unknown defendant as "John Doe" and
service of process may be made by delivery of a copy of the
summons and complaint or other pleadings to the clerk of thecourt in which the action is brought. The insurance carrier
shall have the right to defend in the name of John Doe; pro-
vided, that the bringing of an action against the unknown
owner or operator as John Doe or the conclusion of such an
action shall not constitute a bar to the insured, if the identity
of the owner or operator who caused the injury or damages
complained of becomes known, from bringing an action against
the owner or operator theretofore proceeded against as John
Doe. Nothing in the uninsured motorist provision nor any
other provisions of law shall operate to prevent the joining,
in an action against John Doe, of any other person causing
such injury as a party defendant, and such joinder is hereby
specifically authorized.
61. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34(2) (Supp. 1967). This section con-
tains three requirements in all to restrict fraudulent "John Doe suits:"
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes
bodily injury or property damage to the insured be unknown,
there shall be no right of action or recovery under the unin-
sured motorist provision, unless
(1) The insured or someone in his behalf shall have reported
the accident to some appropriate police authority within a rea-
sonable time, under all the circumstances, after its occurrence
and unless
(2) The injury or damage was caused by physical contact
with the unknown vehicle, and
(3) The insured was not negligent in failing to determine
the identity of the other vehicle and the driver of the other
vehicle at the time of the accident.
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The contact requirement was the basis of the insurer's
defense in Coker v. Nationwide Insurance Co. 62 Coker brought
a declaratory judgment action to determine the liability of
Nationwide under the uninsured motorist provision of the
liability policy issued by it to Coker. Coker had been injured
and his wife killed when he was involved in a head-on
collision with another automobile driven by Shealy. Shealy
was racing with another driver at the time, who left the
scene of the accident and could neither be identified nor
located. Both drivers were concurrently liable for Coker's
damages even though the unknown driver's car never came
into contact with either Coker's car or Shealy's car.
68
Coker's cause of action against Shealy was settled. In the
present action he sought to hold Nationwide liable under the
uninsured motorist endorsement for any judgment which
might be obtained in a John Doe suit against the unknown
driver. Nationwide contended that it was not liable since
it had been stipulated that there had been no contact be-
tween the unknown driver's vehicle and either Shealy's ve-
hicle or Coker's vehicle as required by section 46-750.34(2)
quoted above.
The trial judge held for Coker, reasoning that since the
contact requirement was enacted to prevent fraudulent claims
based on the negligence of phantom drivers, it should have
no applicability to this situation in which the presence of
the unknown driver was admitted. The supreme court re-
versed, holding that the statute clearly required some physical
contact. The court felt it could not go behind the plain
meaning of the statute to determine whether the policy rea-
sons for its enactment were applicable in this situation.64
62. 161 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1968).
63. Skipper v. Hartley, 242 S.C. 221, 130 S.E.2d 486 (1963).
64. The provision, which has been enacted in several states has been
criticized on the grounds that it fails to accomplish its purpose without at
the same time striking down many a bona fide John Doe suit. For ex-
ample, the following illustration was given in Chadwick & Poch6, Cali-
fornia's Uninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13 HASTINGS
L.J. 194, 198 (1961):
A, an uninsured motorist driving a stolen car while intoxicated
careens over the center line of a highway and B, travelling in
the opposite direction, swerves to avoid a head-on collision.
As a result B's car rolls off the road and B and his passengers
are severely injured. Thirty visiting bishops observe the entire
event but none of them remembers the license number of A's
automobile. Because there was no contact with the hit-run
vehicle neither B nor his passengers may invoke the protection
1968]
20
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 7
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss4/7
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20
The question of whether the contact requirement would be
met when the unknown vehicle strikes another vehicle and
knocks this other vehicle into the insured's vehicle was left
open by the court.6 5
C. Liability Insurance
Certificate of Title, Ownership, and Liability Insurance.
During the survey period the South Carolina Supreme Court
terminated the controversy concerning the relationship be-
tween the South Carolina Motor Vehicle Registration and
Licensing Act and the concept of ownership for purposes of
determining liability insurance coverage. The court refused
to follow the federal case of Clouse v. American Mutual Liabil-
ity Insurance Co.; 66 thus, under the Erie doctrine Clouse can
no longer be regarded as a proper statement of South Carolina
law.
Two sections of the South Carolina Code provide for the
issuance of a new certificate of title upon voluntary transfer
of a used vehicle. Section 46-150.15 deals with transfer by
the certificate of title holder. When such a transfer is made,
the seller may either send the old endorsed certificate of
title to the buyer or to the highway department. If he sends
it to the buyer, the buyer must forward it to the highway
department along with an application for a new certificate.6 7
of the uninsured motorist clause. To prevent this absurd re-
sult without opening the door to false claims, the statute should
provide for alternatives to impact, e.g., sworn statements by
isinterested witnesses.
65. This situation has been passed on by the two leading cases in
this area, Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corp. v. Eisenberg, 18
N.Y.2d 1, 218 N.E.2d 524, 271 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1966); Automobile Club
v. Lopez, 238 Cal. App. 2d 441, 47 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1965). Both these
cases held that the contact requirement had been satisfied.
66. 344 F.2d 18 (4th Cir. 1965).
67. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.15 (1962) provides:
If an owner, manufacturer or dealer transfers his interest in a
vehicle other than by the creation of a security interest, he
shall, at the time of delivery of the vehicle, execute an assign-
ment and warranty of title to transferee in the space provided
therefor on the certificate or as the Department prescribes and
cause the certificate and assignment to be mailed or delivered
to the transferee or to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, the transferee shall,
promptly after delivery to him of the vehicle, execute the
application for a new certificate of title in the space provided
therefor on the certificate or as the Department prescribes
and cause the certificate and application to be mailed or de-
livered to the Department.
Except as provided in § 46-150.16, and as between the par-
ties, a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions
of this section have been complied with.
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Section 46-150.16 provides that a dealer may obtain reg-
istered vehicles for sale without applying for a new certificate
of title, but when a transfer of one of these vehicles is made
by the dealer, he must send the old certificate and application
of the buyer for a new certificate to the highway depart-
ment.0 8 Thus, section 46-150.15 differs from section 46-150.16
in that the latter provision places the duty of applying for
a new certificate upon the dealer, while the former provision
allows the seller to place this obligation upon the buyer.
Clouse was the first of a series of cases to investigate the
relationship between these transfer provisions and the de-
termination of ownership for the purpose of deciding cov-
erage questions. In reversing the district court, the federal
court of appeals held that when a dealer did not comply with
section 46-150.16 in selling a repossessed automobile, the
dealer retained ownership of the car for purposes of his ga-
rage policy. Thus, the buyer who had procured no liability
insurance prior to colliding with another vehicle, was held
to be an omnibus insured under the dealer's policy, which
provided coverage for "any automobile owned by . . . the
named insured" and for any person using such an automobile,
"provided the actual use of the automobile [was] by the named
insured or with its permission." The court felt that the
South Carolina Motor Vehicle Registration and Licensing Act
"clearly spelled out a public policy that motor vehicles are
not to be operated upon its highways without liability insur-
ance coverage or its equivalents for uninsured motorists." 9
Thus, the court decided that until the dealer complied with
section 46-150.16 and a certificate of title was issued, the
buyer should remain an insured under the dealer's policy.70
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-130.16 (1962) provides:
If a dealer buys a vehicle and holds it for resale and procures
the certificate of title from the owner within ten days after
delivery to him of the vehicle, he need not send the certificate
to the Department, but, upon transferring the vehicle to an-
other person other than by the creation of a security interest,
shall promptly execute the assignment and warranty of title by
a dealer, showing the names and addresses of the transferee
and any lienholder holding a security interest created or re-
served at the time of the resale and the date of his security
agreement, in the spaces provided therefor on the certificate
or as the Department prescribes, and mail or deliver the certifi-
cate to the Department with the transferee's application for a
new certificate.
69. 844 F.2d at 19.
70. Clouse and the pre-Clouse cases are discussed in Kemmerlin, Insur-
ance, 1964-1965 Survey of S.C. Law, 18 S.C.L. REv. 68, 74-82 (1966).
1968]
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The next case in this area, Grain Dealers Mutual Insur-
ance Co. v. Julian,71 was decided by the South Carolina Su-
preme Court just before the federal court of appeals decision
in Clouse appeared in the advance sheets.72 Grain Dealers in-
volved a different situation from that in Clouse, but virtually
the same issue. Instead of the question of omnibus coverage
under the seller's policy, there was the question of coverage
under an operator's policy which had been issued to the buyer
and which excluded owned automobiles from coverage. It
was clear that the procedure of section 46-150.15 had not
been followed in the sales transaction, and after the buyer
caused injury to several parties in a collision involving the
newly acquired vehicle, it was argued that the operator's
policy provided coverage since title to the car had never
passed to the buyer. The court held, however, that the buyer
was the owner of the car even though section 46-150.15 had
not been complied with and no certificate of title had been
issued to the buyer. Thus, the court decided that the op-
erator's policy did not provide coverage and stated clearly
that "title to a motor vehicle passes to a purchaser notwith-
standing the want of compliance with the Title Certificate
law.","3
Notwithstanding the rather clear language in Grain Dealers,
the federal district court in Security General Insurance Co. v.
71. 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965).
72. As Grain Dealers appeared in the Smith Advance Sheets, there was
the following intriguing reference to the district court opinion in Clouse:
The cases of Clouse v. American Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 232 F.
Supp. 1010, and Hanna v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 233
F. Supp. 510, held that, as between the parties, compliance with
statutory directions as to title and insurance is not necessary
to transfer ownership of an automobile. In Clouse it was held
that a purchaser who gave an automobile dealer a down pay-
ment for an automobile and executed a conditional sales con-
tract for the balance, was the owner of the automobile when it
subsequently became involved in a collision with a third party,
even though the purchaser [sic] had failed to mail to the
State Highway Department the papers necessary to effect a
transfer of title. In Hanna it was held that a vendor's delivery
of possession of an automobile to his vendee, together with the
execution of a Certificate of Title in blank and the registration
card, effectively divests the vendor of ownership.
The court of appeals decision in Clouse appeared before Grain Dealers was
printed in the Southeastern Reporter advance sheets; when it was printed
te above paragraph had been deleted. It has been said that both parties
in settlement negotiations involving coverage questions which turned on
whether or not Clouse would be followed by the South Carolina court often
insited that this deletion was favorable to their position.
73. Grain Dealers Mlut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 99, 145 S.E.2d
685, 690 (1965).
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Bill Vernon Chevrolet, Inc.7 was able to say that "this court
perceives no intimation in Grain Dealers that the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court disapproves this [the Clouse] interpre-
tation. ' 7 5 The factual situation in Security General was vir-
tually the same as that in Clouse. The district court found
Clouse and Grain Dealers reconciliable in that Grain Dealers
did not involve an intermediary car dealer as did Clouse and
in that Grain Dealers interpreted section 46-150.15 while
Clouse interpreted section 46-150.16. The court felt that
Clouse had been based primarily on the dealer's breach of
duty in failing to comply with section 46-150.16, which caused
the buyer to be able to operate the vehicle without a certificate
of title or insurance. Indeed, the court extended this rationale
of Clouse to a policy which apparently did not, by its terms,
provide coverage for the buyer even if the dealer were still
the owner of the vehicle:
The Clouse interpretation of Section 46-150.16 makes
this section a vital part of the State's scheme of in-
surance. Any part of the policy . . . inconsistent
therewith is void and the pertinent provisions of
the statute prevail as much as if expressly incor-
porated in the policy.7 6
The struggle finally came to an end with St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Boykin 7 decided during the survey
period by the South Carolina Supreme Court. This case in-
volved the same facts as Clouse, and as could be expected, the
Clouse holding was rejected and the Grain Dealers holding
extended to cover the Clouse situation. The court disagreed
with the Clouse theory that in the transfer of title provisions
the legislature had "spelled out a public policy that motor
vehicles are not to be operated upon its highways without
liability insurance coverage or its equivalents for uninsured
motorists."7 8 In particular the court noted that while liability
insurance or payment of an uninsured motorist fee, as well as
a certificate of title, is a prerequisite for registration and li-
censing of a motor vehicle to be used on the highway, liability
insurance is not a requirement for obtaining the certificate
74. 263 F. Supp. 74 (D.S.C. 1967).
75. Id. at 78.
76. Id. at 79.
77. 161 S.E.2d 818 (S.C. 1968).
78. Clouse v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 344 F.2d 18, 19 (4th Cir.
1965).
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of title itself under the transfer provisions.7 Thus, noncom-
pliance with the transfer provisions should have no effect
so far as insurance coverage is concerned.
The question of ownership for insurance purposes also
arose in American Indemnity Co. v. Richland Oil Co.80 This
was a declaratory judgment action brought by American
against several defendants, including Canal Insurance Com-
pany to determine its liability under a fleet policy issued to
Riclland Oil.
Richland Oil, insured by American, and Finch Transporta-
tion Company, insured by Canal, were closely held corpora-
tions, both of which were managed by Henry Finch. Finch
Transportation was the owner of a tractor, from a tractor
trailer unit, which was transferred to Richland Oil. Richland
Oil paid some $11,000 to Associates Discount Corporation,
part of which represented the amount due on a note from
Finch Transportation secured by the tractor. According to
Henry Finch, Richland Oil was considered the owner of the
tractor even though the certificate of title remained in Finch
Transportation. The tractor was listed on the fleet schedule
of the Canal policy, but not in the American policy, and the
tractor was still used occasionally by Finch Transportation.
Moreover, Henry Finch never notified Canal of the purported
transfer as required by the policy.
The tractor and an attached trailer were wrecked by an
employee of Richland Oil. Both insurance companies denied
coverage.
The Canal policy excluded from coverage any person or
organization "using the described automobile pursuant to
any lease, contract of hire, bailment, rental agreement, or any
similar contract or agreement either written or oral, expressed
or implied . . . ." The American policy excluded liability for
damages which occurred "while any trailer covered by this
policy is used with any automobile owned or hired by the
insured and not covered by like insurance in the company."
The court granted both insurers' motions for summary
judgment and held that the exclusions in both policies ap-
79. The relevant registration provisions are found in S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-11, -17(3) (1962), 46-136 to -137 (Supp. 1967); see Kemnierlin,
Insurance, 1964-1965 Survey of S.C. Law, 18 S.C.L. Rnv. 68, 81-82 (1966).
80. 273 F. Supp. 702 (D.S.C. 1967).
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plied so that neither insurer was obligated to defend the tort
suits. This decision was based on the court's finding that
Finch Transportation was the owner of the tractor involved
in the accident and had rented this tractor to Richland Oil in
consideration of the payment made to Associates Discount.
The documentary evidence of ownership by Finch Transporta-
tion,"' coupled with the fact that Henry Finch did not seem
to regard the corporations as separate entities, capable of
purchasing from each other, was found to be persuasive.
Under these circumstances, the tractor was being used pur-
suant to a "contract of hire" within the Canal exclusion, and
the trailer was used with an automobile "hired by the in-
sured and not covered by like insurance in the company"
within the American exclusion.
Omnibus Clause. A liability policy issued in South Carolina
must provide coverage not only for the named insured but,
under the omnibus clause, for additional classes of persons as
well. 2 Cases decided during the survey period on the omni-
bus clause involved two of these classes, persons driving with
permission of the named insured and relative residents living
in the home of the named insured.
The standard garage policy omnibus clause, applied in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federated Mutual Implement &
Hardware Co.,8 3 extends coverage to "any person while using,
81. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-150.11 (1962) provides: "A certificate of
title issued by the Department is prima facie evidence of the facts appear-
ing on it." The court found that this presumption had not been overcome.
For cases holding the presumption to have been overcome see Grain Dealers
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Julian, 247 S.C. 89, 145 S.E.2d 685 (1965); Bankers Ins.
Co. v. Griffen, 244 S.C. 552, 137 S.E.2d 785 (1964); Porter v. Hardee, 241
S.C. 474, 129 S.E.2d 131 (1963).
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.32 (Supp. 1967) provides:
No policy or contract of bodily injury liability insurance or of
property damage liability insurance ... shall be issued or de-
livered in this State ... unless it contains a provision insuring
the persons defined as insured, against loss from the liability
imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of such motor vehicles ....
The term "insured" is defined in S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31(2) (Supp.
1967) as follows:
The term "insured" means the named insured and, while resi-
dent of the same household, the spouse of any such named in-
sured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or other-
wise, and any person who uses, with the consent, express or
implied, of the named insured, the motor vehicle to which the
policy applies and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the
policy applies or the personal representative of any of the
above.
83. 161 S.E.2d 240 (S.C. 1968).
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with the permission of the named insured, an automobile to
which the insurance applies.., provided such person's actual
operation . . .is within the scope of such permission." On
the issue of who is a permittee under this clause, the South
Carolina court has followed what is known as the strict rule -
that "[p]ermission to use a covered vehicle for a particular
purpose does not imply permission to use it for all purposes. '84
Allstate had issued its garage liability policy to Martin,
who managed a service station. Federated had issued its ga-
rage policy to Bailey, who managed a used car lot. Bailey
arranged with Martin to have a used car of Bailey's washed
and serviced. Bailey's employee was to drive the car to the
service station and pick up Martin's employee, who was to
return with Bailey's employee and then drive back to Martin's
service station. On the way back Martin's employee deviated
from the direct route between Martin's and Bailey's, and
after the deviation was completed and he was returning
toward Martin's, he negligently wrecked the vehicle. All
claims resulting from the wreck were settled by Allstate,
who brought this declaratory judgment action against Fed-
erated to determine which insurance company, if either, pro-
vided coverage.
It was determined that Allstate's policy provided excess
coverage to Federated's policy if Federated's policy provided
coverage at all. The issue of Federated's coverage turned on
whether or not Martin's employee was an omnibus insured un-
der Federated's policy. Federated contended he was not since
he had deviated from his assigned mission and therefore was
not driving "with the permission of the named insured" or
"within the scope of such permission." The lower court so
found on stipulated facts and the superme court affirmed.
Allstate contended that an analogy should be drawn between
the scope of permission issue and the much litigated scope
of employment issue in torts cases.85 There is authority for
the proposition that a servant in the process of returning to
84. Id. at 241. This rule has been applied in Crenshaw v. Harleysville
Mut. Cas. Co., 246 S.C. 549, 144 S.E.2d 810 (1965); Eagle Fire Co. v.
Mullins, 238 S.C. 272, 120 S.E.2d 1 (1961); Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
288 S.C. 217, 119 S.E.2d 746 (1961). These cases are not altogether dear,
however, on the application of this rule to second permittees. For an ex-
haustive discussion and categorization of the various situations involving
second permittees, see Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 10 (1965).
85. Brief for Appellant at 4-7.
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his assigned mission after a deviation is within the scope of
his employment.80 The supreme court apparently rejected
this analogy, holding that the degree of deviation necessary
to bring a permittee outside the scope of the omnibus clause
was a question of fact and that the trial judge's finding was
not clearly erronous.
The strict rule that "permission to use a covered vehicle
for a particular purpose does not imply permission to use
it for all purposes" was also applied by the federal district
court in Great American Insurance Co. v. McDowell.87 Great
American brought a declaratory judgment action, seeking a
determination that its garage policy issued to Coastal Motor
Company did not afford coverage for an accident caused by
the negligence of one of Coastal's employees. The tort plain-
tiffs contended that the employee had implied permission
to use the vehicle at the time of the wreck and was thus
an omnibus insured under the standard garage policy om-
nibus clause.
The employee, McDowell, had worked sporadically at
Coastal for over ten years and had been hired the last time
on January 21, 1966. Since McDowell had no means of
transportation to and from work, his employer told him he
could use a company car for this purpose. The employer,
however, specifically denied McDowell permission to use the
car on weekends because he knew McDowell was a heavy
drinker. He had preivously fired him for drinking and us-
ing a customer's car without permission.
McDowell drove the car home on Saturday, January 29,
1966, against the instructions of his employer. On the fol-
lowing Monday and Tuesday he did not appear for work,
and on Tuesday at 7:00 p.m. the wreck occurred out of which
the tort suits pending against McDowell arose. Earlier on
Tuesday Elizabeth McDowell had also wrecked the company
car, damaging another vehicle owned by Bellamy. McDowell
told Bellamy to bring his car to Coastal's repair department
and it would be fixed. Bellamy did so on Wednesday, and
this was the first notice received by anyone at Coastal that
McDowell still had the company car. At this time an official
at Coastal obtained a warrant for McDowell's arrest.
86. Carrol v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 207 S.C. 339, 35 S.E.2d 425 (1945).
87. 276 F. Supp. 702 (D.S.C. 1967).
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The district court found that under the strict rule McDowell
did not have implied permission to use the car on the day
of the wreck. Thus, the court held that McDowell was not an
omnibus insured under Coastal's policy and that Great Ameri-
can did not have to defend the pending tort actions. The
particular South Carolina rule applicable to this situation
was quoted by the court as follows:
Consent to the use by an employee of his employer's
automobile, outside the scope of his employment, will
be implied only if there has been "a course of con-
duct or a practice with the knowledge and acquies-
cence of the owner, such as would indicate to a rea-
sonable mind that the employee had the right to
assume permission under the particular circum-
stances. '88
Another case involving the permission aspect of the om-
nibus clause, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Ameri-
can Insurance Co.,89 held that the issue of implied permission
was properly submitted to the jury. In this ease St. Paul
brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether
it was obligated to defend a tort action under a policy is-
sued to Marvin F. Matthews as named insured. The tort
action arose out of an accident in which the named insured's
father was driving the insured vehicle. If the father was
not an omnibus insured, American, who was the tort plain-
tiff's uninsured motorist carrier, would be liable for any
judgment which might be obtained against the father.
The issue of implied permission arose out of the following
facts. The father lived around the corner from his son's
house. Although the insured vehicle was left at the father's
house, the father had no South Carolina driver's license. The
car was used primarily by the named insured's mother. The
son testified that his father had been told he should not
drive the car and that to his knowledge his father had no
key to the car. There was testimony, however, that the
father did have a key, drove the car about once a week to
deliver eggs, had driven to another town to visit his sister,
and had occasionally driven the car to the son's house.
88. Id. at 706, quoting from Crenshaw v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co.,
246 S.C. 549, 554, 144 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1965).
89. 159 S.E.2d 921 (S.C. 1968).
(Vol. 20
29
Earle: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INSURANCE SURVEYED
Although the son testified that he had no knowledge of
his father's use of the car, both the lower court and the
supreme court held that the defendant had produced suffi-
cient circumstantial evidence of implied permission to create
a jury question. The jury rejected the son's testimony and
decided that under the circumstantial evidence the son had
impliedly consented to his father's use of the car when the
accident occurred. Thus, the father was an omnibus insured
under St. Paul's policy, and St. Paul was obligated to defend
the tort action.
In Buddin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.0o the court
was concerned with the relative-resident category of omnibus
insureds. Aetna Insurance Company had paid the tort plain-
tiff $2000 pursuant to its uninsured motorist endorsement
and brought this action along with the tort defendant to re-
cover the amount paid from Nationwide. Nationwide's liabil-
ity depended on whether Buddin, the tort defendant, was an
omnibus insured under a liability policy issued to Buddin's
uncle as named insured. The trial judge entered judgment
for Nationwide on a jury verdict. The supreme court re-
versed, holding that as a matter of law Buddin was an om-
nibus insured under his uncle's liability policy.
The omnibus clause of the uncle's policy extended cov-
erage "to any other land motor vehicle . . . while used by
the [named insured] or by his spouse and the relatives of
either if a resident of the same household." The accident
occurred on October 10, 1965, when Buddin was driving an
automobile owned by James Hill. Neither Hill nor Buddin
owned liability policies themselves.
Both of Buddin's parents had died prior to the accident,
and their home had been purchased by Buddin's uncle, the
named insured. While attending college, Buddin spent sev-
eral weekends with his uncle. After leaving college he stayed
with his uncle for two months. After a trip to California he
spent seven or eight days at the uncle's house and then moved
into a motel, and later a trailer. In August 1965 while un-
employed he moved back in with his uncle, where he remained
through the date of the accident until December 28, 1965.
The facts concerning Buddin's relationship to his uncle
between August and December 1965 are set out in detail by
90. 250 S.C. 332, 157 S.E.2d 633 (1967).
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the court. In sum it can be said that their relationship was
very close to that of father and son, even though the nephew
paid some rent when he could afford it.
The defendant argued that it had sustained its burden
of producing sufficient evidence to create a jury question
by offering evidence of the following: (1) that the nephew
made rental payments, suggesting the relationship was that
of landlord and tenant, (2) that the uncle did not maintain
the degree of control over his nephew normally exercised
over a relative resident, and (3) that there was a lack of per-
manency in the living arrangements between the uncle and
nephew. The court held that this was not a sufficient pro-
duction of evidence to contradict the plaintiff's evidence that
Buddin was a relative resident of his uncle's household so
that a directed verdict should have been granted the plaintiff.
Omnibus Exclusion: Non-Owned Automobiles in Automo-
bile Business. Although a typical omnibus clause extends
coverage to the named and omnibus insureds when they are
driving a non-owned automobile, many policies exclude from
this coverage any accident occasioned by use of a non-owned
automobile in the automobile business.91 Heaton v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. 9 2 held that such an exclusion
was valid according to South Carolina cases even though
omnibus coverage is required by the Motor Vehicle Safety
Responsibility Act.0 3
91. This exclusion has been explained as follows:
Coverage on non-owned automobiles has become almost stand-
ard in automobile insurance policies. Its purpose is to give an
insured who has coverage on a described, owned automobile pro-
tection when the insured uses a non-owned automobile. Such
insurance is afforded in recognition of the fact that an insured
may from time to time use automobiles which are not protected
by the type coverage which he carries on the vehicle de-
scribed and covered by his policy. An insurer is willing to cover
such a non-owned automobile where the use by its insured is
casual and the non-owned automobile is of the type covered in
the policy, in most situations a private passenger automobile.
However, an insurer does not wish this coverage to extend to a
non-owned automobile used regularly by an insured, since such
an extension of coverage could result in the risk to the insurer
being greatly increased. Therefore, after the grant of non-
ownership coverage, the insurer must undertake to limit it by
exclusions.
Kemmerlin, Insurance, 1964-1965 Survey of South Carolina Law, 18 S.C.L.
REv. 68-69 (1966).
92. 278 F. Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1968).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31(2), -750.32 (Supp. 1967). These
provisions are set out supra note 82.
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The omnibus exclusion applied in this case provided that
non-owned automobile coverage did not extend to "any ac-
cident arising out of the operation of an automobile business."
Automobile business was defined as "the business of selling,
repairing, servicing, storing or parking of automobiles."
A tort judgment was obtained against an employee of a
public parking lot when he backed a customer's car into the
tort plaintiff's car. The employee's liability policy contained
the above omnibus exclusion, and the insurer refused to defend
on the ground that the exclusion applied to the employee's
accident. The employee and his judgment creditor brought
this suit in the federal district court against State Farm to
recover the amount of the judgment. State Farm moved
for summary judgment on the ground that there was no
factual issue for determination concerning the applicability
of the exclusion. 94
The plaintiffs contended that the applicability of the ex-
clusion to this situation presented a question of fact, and al-
ternatively, if the exclusion did clearly apply, it was void
under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
On the first issue the court held that there was no question
of fact surrounding the applicability of the exclusion in the
present situation because the accident clearly arose out of the
operation of the business of parking automobiles. The court
noted that the case cited by the plaintiffs95 for the proposi-
tion that such an exclusion always presented a question of
fact when applied to any particular factual situation, had
construed the newer exclusion which applies to an "automobile
while used in the automobile business." In the court's opinion
the words "used in the automobile business" tended to create
factual issues not created by the words "arising out of the
operation of an automobile business."
On the second issue the plaintiffs relied on the definition
of "insured" in section 46-750.31 (2) of the South Carolina
Code. This definition, taken together with section 46-750.32
requires the insurer to provide coverage for the named insured
and relative residents "while in a motor vehicle." 96 The
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (c) provides for summary judgment if there is
no "genuine issue of fact."
95. American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Surety Indem. Co., 246 S.C. 220, 143
S.E.2d 371 (1965).
96. These provisions are set out supra note 82.
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court, however, interpreted South Carolina cases to mean
that the general coverage requirements of sections 46-
750.31(1) and 46-750.32 did not prevent the insurer from
placing reasonable limitations on its liability. The exclusion
for non-owned automobiles used in the automobile business
was found to be reasonable.
97
Automatic Insurance Clause. The purpose of the standard
automatic insurance clause contained in many liability poli-
cies is to provide immediate coverage for new automobiles
which may be acquired by the named insured.98 The standard
clause contains two alternative provisions. On the one hand,
coverage is provided under the replacement provision for a
newly acquired automobile which replaces the presently in-
sured automobile. Notice to the insurer may or may not be
required by the policy as a condition subsequent to this cov-
erage. On the other hand, coverage is provided under the
blanket or fleet provision for newly acquired automobiles
which do not replace the presently insured vehicle if two
conditions are met. The conditions are that the company
must insure all automobiles owned by the named insured
and that the insured must give notice to the company within
a specified time from the date of acquisition of his election
to make the policy applicable.90 The requirement of notice
is a condition subsequent, and coverage is provided automati-
cally from the date the new automobile is acquired to the
date when notice to the company is due.' 00
The distinctive feature of the replacement alternative is
that when replacement occurs, coverage on the replaced ve-
hicle ends, and coverage on the newly acquired vehicle begins;
thus, under this alternative the insurer's risk is limited to one
vehicle. 101 Fear of increasing this risk led the court in
Fleming v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.10 2 to hold that
the insured's newly acquired vehicle did not "replace" the
presently insured vehicle.
In 1963 Fleming, who was in the television repair business,
owned a 1954 Pontiac and a 1962 Ford van. The 1954 Pontiac
97. See note 91 supra.
98. See 12 G. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INsuRANcE LAW § 45:184 (2d ed.
1964).
99. See gencrallij id. §§ 45:181-83.
100. Id. § 45:205.
101. See the text of the standard automatic clause in id. § 45:182.
102. 383 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1967).
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was not insured at this time since it was not in running
condition and had not been licensed with the highway de-
partment.
On March 16, 1964, Fleming traded the 1954 Pontiac as a
down payment on a 1960 Pontiac. At the same time he
began looking for a buyer for his television repair business.
Throughout the period from March 16 to April 25, he con-
tinued to drive both the new Pontiac and the Ford van. On
April 25 the television repair business, including the Ford
van, was sold. The buyer actually took title to the Ford in
May 1964 when the final payment was made to a finance
company.
On August 30, 1964, Fleming wrecked the 1960 Pontiac.
Tort suits arising out of this wreck were pending when the
present declaratory judgment action was brought by Na-
tionwide. Fleming contended that Nationwide was obligated
to defend the tort actions because the 1960 Pontiac was a
replacement vehicle for the Ford van under the automatic
clause in the policy.10
The federal court of appeals affirmed the district court's
holding' °4 that the vehicle being "replaced must be disposed
of or be incapable of further service at the time the "re-
placement" vehicle is purchased. 0 5 Since Fleming had con-
tinued to drive the Ford van for over a month after the
1960 Pontiac had been purchased, the Pontiac was not a
103. Nationwide's automatic clause provided:
[T]he word 'automobile' means:
Newly Acquired Automoble "-- an automoble, ownership of
which is acquired by the Named Insured or his spouse if a resi-
dent of the same household, if (i) it replaces an automobile
owned by either and covered by this policy, or the Company in-
sures all automobiles owned by the Named Insured and such
spouse on the date of its delivery, and (ii) the Named Insured
or such spouse notifies the Company within thirty days follow-ing such delivery date; but such notice is not required under
[personal injury, property damage, and medical payments cov-
erage] if the newly acquired automobile replaces an owned
automobile covered by this policy.
104. Nationwide cmut. Ins. Co. v. Fleming, 257 F. Supp. 267 (D.S.C.1966). The district court opinion is discussed in Insuranzce, 1967 Survey
of S.C. Law, 19 S.C.L. Rnv. 575, 605-07 (1967).
105. The court relied principally on Mitcham v. Travelers Indem. Co.,
127 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1942). The court found that the only South Carolina
case to construe a replacement clause, MIiller v. Stuyvesant Ins. Co., 242
S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913 (1963), involved the situation in which the in-
sured transferred the "replaced" vehicle to his wife. The South Carolina
court held that there was no replacement under these circumstances.
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replacement vehicle under the above rule, and Nationwide's
policy did not provide coverage under the automatic clause. 10 6
Undoubtedly, the court's opinion was based at least par-
tially on the realization that to hold otherwise would allow
an insured who operated both vehicles for a time to take
alternative positions on the replacement issue, depending on
which vehicle was being driven when the wreck occurred.
A dissenting opinion was filed in which it was argued that
the risk of double coverage was not present in this case since
the collision occurred after the Ford had been sold, not while
both vehicles were in the insured's possession.
1°7
The other alternative under the automatic clause, known
as the blanket or fleet provision, was construed by the federal
court of appeals in St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Lumbermen's Mutual Insurance Co.10  Varndell
Gallardo and his father Eusebio Gallardo purchased a car for
Varndell's use. Eusebio signed both the conditional sales
contract and registration application, and Varndell paid
the uninsured motorist fee. Varndell's mother then talked
with Lumbermen's agent concerning liability insurance for
the car, but no policy was procured since she considered the
premiums too high. A collision then occurred while Varndell
was driving the car, and two tort suits arising out of this
collision were brought against him.
St. Paul, joined by State Farm, brought a declaratory judg-
ment action as uninsured motorist carriers for the tort plain-
tiffs against Lumbermen's to determine its liability under
a family combination policy issued to Eusebio before the new
car had been purchased. Lumbermen's policy contained the
standard automatic provision which extended coverage to
newly acquired automobiles of the named insured provided
the insured gave the company notice during the policy period
106. The court also noted that the policy contained a declaration that
the Ford van was a commercial vehicle. The fact that the 1960 Pontiac
was a pleasure vehicle helped substantiate, in the court's opinion, a finding
that there had been no replacement. Most policies apparently require that
the newly acquired vehicle be used for the same purpose as the replaced
vehicle. See 12 G. Coucn, supra note 98, §§ 45:182, 45:213, 45:214.
107. The dissenting judge noted that in Mitcham v. Travelers Indem.
Co., 127 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1942), upon which the majority relied, the
collision had occurred before the replaced vehicle was sold, distinguishing
that case from the present situation.
108. 378 F.2d 313 (4th Cir. 1967).
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"of his election to make this and no other policy issued by
the company applicable to such automobile. .. ."
St. Paul and State Farm argued that Eusebio was the
owner of the newly acquired automobile which was therefore
covered under Lumbermen's automatic clause since the wreck
had occurred before notice was due under the notice pro-
vision.10 9 Lumbermen's argued that Varndell was the owner
of the new car, and alternatively, that Eusebio through his
wife had elected to obtain other insurance on the automobile
when she talked with Lumbermen's agent, thus waiving auto-
matic coverage under the notice provision.
The district court found that Eusebio was the owner of the
car but that Eusebio had elected against automatic coverage
so that the blanket provision did not apply.110 St. Paul
and State Farm appealed from the finding that Eusebio
had made an election against automatic coverage, and Lum-
bermen's cross appealed from the finding that Eusebio
was the owner of the car.
In a per curiam opinion the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's finding that Eusebio was the owner of the
car, but reversed on the second finding that Eusebio had
elected against coverage. Apparently neither Eusebio's wife
nor Lumbermen's agent was aware of the automatic provision
whereby a true election could have been made. Moreover,
the court concluded that the notice provision allowed the
insured to "shop and to compare.""'
Duties of the Insurer: Tortious Failure to Settle. In 1931
the South Carolina Supreme Court decided in Tyger River
Pine Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co.1 2 that an insured had a
109. Varndell, even though relative resident of Eusebio's household, was
apparently not an omnibus insured under Eusebio's policy as to the non-
named automobile owned by Eusebio. It has been suggested that S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31, .32 (Supp. 1967) might require coverage for
Varndell as omnibus insured no matter who owned the car. Insurance,
1967 Survey of S.C. Law, 19 S.C.L. REV. 575, 605 n.100 (1967). But see
Heaton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 278 F. Supp. 725 (D.S.C. 1968);
American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Surety Indem. Co., 246 S.C. 220, 143 S.E.2d
371 (1965); Stanley v. Reserve Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 533, 121 S.E.2d 10
(1961). These cases suggest that reasonable exclusions are allowable
notwithstanding the mandatory insurance provisions of the code.
110. The district court opinion is discussed in Insurance, 1967 Survey of
S.C. Law, 19 S.C.L. REv. 575, 604-05 (1967).
111. 378 F.2d at 315.
112. 163 S.C. 229, 161 S.E. 491 (1931) (insurer's demurrer overruled);
170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346 (1933) (judgment for insured affirmed).
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cause of action against its liability insurer for negligent
failure to settle a tort action within the limits of the policy.
The insured was allowed to recover the amount which the
tort judgment exceeded the policy limits, and the court seemed
to say that there was no requirement that the insured prove
bad faith or fraud on the part of the insurer. S
There is a distinction, however, between a suit brought
under the Tyger River theory and a suit brought for failure
of the insurer to defend the insured in the tort suit when
the policy provides coverage. This distinction was illustrated
by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Arnold,1 4
in which the federal district court disposed of pre-trial mo-
tions. State Farm brought a declaratory judgment action to
determine whether it provided coverage for a tort judgment
rendered against Arnold, its insured. State Farm had denied
coverage ever since receiving notice of the accident and had
refused to defend. The judgment against Arnold was for
an amount greater than the limits of the liability policy.
Arnold counterclaimed, setting up two causes of action, one
to recover the amount of the tort judgment and one to
recover actual and punitive damages allegedly caused by
the insurer's willful failure to settle or defend.
The court held that the first cause of action was based on
breach of contractual obligation to defend, the second on
tortious failure to settle. The insurer's motion to strike the
second cause of action was sustained. Miles v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.115 was interpreted as stand-
ing for the proposition that when the insurer denies coverage
in good faith, it is not liable for failure to settle even if it
later turns out that the policy does provide coverage. In
other words the court determined that Tyger River was
based entirely on negligent mishandling of a suit and did not
comprehend the present situation in which the insurer re-
fused to handle the suit at all.
The federal district court's decision would seem to have
been a correct interpretation of South Carolina law. Under
the standard liability policy the insurer is obligated to de-
fend any action brought against the insured for which the
113. 170 S.C. at 291, 170 S.E. at 348.
114. 276 F. Supp. 765 (D.S.C. 1967).
115. 238 S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961)
[Vol. 20
37
Earle: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INSURANCE SURVEYED
policy provides coverage, 11 6 but there is no corresponding
provision obligating the insurer to settle; the policy merely
provides that the insurer has the right to control settlement
negotiations.'1 7 Thus, any suit brought against the insurer
for negligent failure to settle within the policy limits must
be based in tort, while a suit against the insurer for failure
to defend is based on breach of contract. 1 8 According to
Miles v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.,119
in the action for breach of contract the insured can recover
only the amount of the judgment which is within the policy
limits absent a showing of bad faith on the part of the
insurer; as has been noted, the Tyger River doctrine allows
recovery for the full tort judgment even if it exceeds the
policy limits, and the insured need only prove negligence.
In another case brought under the Tyger River doctrine,
Andrews v. Central Surety Insurance Co., 20 the insured re-
covered $134,000, the total amount of two tort judgments
rendered against him less $10,000 paid by the insurer under
the policy.
The tort suits were occasioned by the following facts. An-
drews was riding as a passenger in his own automobile being
driven by a sailor when it collided with another car driven
by Green. Green was burned to death when his vehicle caught
fire. Both the insured and the sailor were drunk; the wreck
occurred when the sailor pulled out to pass, meeting Green's
vehicle head-on.
Green's estate retained an attorney and began negotiations
with Central's adjuster. A settlement offer of $9,950 was
made and rejected by the adjuster, who counteroffered to
pay $9,850. The attorney extended the time for acceptance of
his offer on two different occasions, and Andrew's personal
attorney advised the adjuster to accept since it appeared
that a jury would render a verdict for an amount well in
116. 7A J. APPLnMAN, INSURmCE LAW AND PRAcTICE § 4682 (1962).
117. Id. §§ 4681, 4711.
118. See Miles v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 374, 120
S.E.2d 217 (1961). Compare Fuller v. Eastern Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 240
S.C. 75, 124 S.E.2d 602 (1962), with Andrews v. Central Sur. Ins. Co.,
271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967), aff'd mem. sub rom. Andrews v. Com-
mercial Union Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1968).
119. 238 S.C. 374, 120 S.E.2d 217 (1961).
120. 271 F. Supp. 814 (D.S.C. 1967), affd mem. sub nom. Andrews v.
Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 935 (4th Cir. 1968).
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excess of the $10,000 policy limit. The adjuster so advised
the company, but no action was taken.
Wrongful death and survival actions were then commenced
on behalf of Green's estate against Andrews.121 After in-
vestigating the case, Central's local attorneys offered to settle
for the full policy limit of $10,000, which offer was now
rejected by the estate. The two cases were tried and resulted
in verdicts for $133,000, and $11,000 respectively. Central
paid the policy limit of $10,000, and Andrews brought the
present action to recover the remaining $134,000 plus at-
torney's fees for the tort action, alleging that Central negli-
gently and in bad faith failed to settle within the policy
limits.
The case was tried before the federal district court without
a jury. The court found that the circumstances surrounding
the death and survival actions presented a clear case of liabil-
ity and that it was unreasonable for Central to have rejected
the offer of settlement within the policy limits.1 22 Under
the Tyger River doctrine Central was held liable in tort to
Andrews for the amount of the verdicts less the $10,000
paid.12 8 The district court's holding was affirmed in a memo-
randum opinion by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. 24
Duties of the Insured. The standard automobile liability
policy requires the insurer to defend any suit against the
insured even though it is groundless, false, or fraudulant.
There is a corresponding right of the insurer to exclusive
control over this litigation. The standard policy also contains
a provision under which the insured promises to cooperate
121. Apparently the tort suits were brought under the theory of joint
enterprise-imputed negligence since the sailor, not the insured was driving.
122. Investigation revealed that the sailor had been driving too fast for
conditions, had failed to yield the right of way, had passed unlawfully,
and had been driving under the influence of intoxicants. 271 F. Supp. at
819. After offering to settle for the full $10,000, Central's counsel an-
swered only by way of general denial, suggesting that the issue of liability
had been virtually conceded. On the question of wrongful death damages,
it should be noted that Green was 26 years old, made $60.00 a week, and
had a life expectancy of 44.90 years. The survival action was based on the
fact that Green was not killed immediately, but burned to death.
123. The court did not allow the cost to the insured of retaining an at-
torney for the personal injury action, citing American Fidelity & Cas.
Co. v. Greyhound Corp., 258 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1958); Christian v. Pre-
ferred Accident Ins. Co., 89 F. Supp. 88 (N.D. Cal. 1950). The court also
noted that the damages in this suit would be handled by the attorney who
prosecuted the personal injury suit against Andrews.
124. Andrews v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 935 (4th Cir.
1968).
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with the insurer in the defense of any suit for which the
policy provides coverage. In South Carolina a breach of this
latter provision, known as the cooperation clause, will relieve
the insurer of liability under the policy only if the insurer
can show that it was substantially prejudiced thereby.
125
In Vaught v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,126 an
action on a liability policy by the tort plaintiff as judgment
creditor, Nationwide contended it was relieved of liability
because the insured had failed to assist in securing wit-
nesses for the defense of the tort suit as required by the
cooperation clause in the policy. The lower court entered
judgment for the plaintiff, and the supreme court affirmed.
The cooperation clause, which formed the basis of the in-
surer's defense, provided as follows:
The insured shall cooperate with the company and,
upon the company's request, shall attend hearings
and trials and shall assist in effectuating settle-
ments, securing and giving evidence, obtaining the
attendance of witnesses and in the conduct of suits.
The tort action arose out of an accident involving the named
insured's truck driver and the plaintiff. The wreck occurred
in South Carolina while the insured's driver was making
one of his regular trips between Florida and North Carolina.
Suit was brought against the insured in Horry County, the
place of the accident. Before trial Nationwide's counsel re-
quested the insured to have his driver available as a witness.
The insured instructed the driver to stop over on his way
from North Carolina to Florida. Although the driver was
present for trial, the trial judge declared a mistrial before
time for him to testify.
A second trial was held on January 6, 1964. Again the
insured's driver was instructed to be present. This time,
however, he did not appear by the time trial was to begin.
Nationwide's counsel informed the court that one of his wit-
nesses had not arrived yet but was expected to be there in
time to testify. No motion for continuance was made at this
time. During the trial, however, the insured notified his
125. Crook v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d
241 (1960) ; Pharr v. Canal Ins. Co., 233 S.C. 266, 104 S.E.2d 394 (1958).
126. 250 S.C. 65. 156 S.E.2d 627 (1967).
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attorney by telephone that the driver would not arrive until
the following day, and a motion for continuance was then
made and denied.
Nationwide contended that the driver's absence was sub-
stantially prejudicial to its defense. The trial judge had in-
structed the jury that it could draw the inference from the
driver's absence that his testimony would have been adverse
to the insured had he been present.127 Furthermore, the
driver was not a resident of South Carolina and could not
be subpoenaed, so Nationwide was totally dependent upon its
insured to have the driver present for trial.
There is authority for the proposition that if the named
insured himself does not appear for trial, there is a preju-
dicial lack of cooperation in many circumstances as a matter
of law, and the insurer will be relieved of liability. 28 Al-
though the truck driver was neither a named insured nor a
party defendant in the tort action, Nationwide argued that
the same rule should apply. 29 The court held, however, that
the issue of cooperation had been properly submitted to the
jury: The jury could find from the evidence that the in-
sured had instructed the driver to return to the second trial
and that there had been ample time for him to do so after
leaving Florida for North Carolina. Under these circum-
stances the insured had done all he could be reasonably ex-
pected to do by way of having his driver present at trial,
especially since he had arrived in time for the first trial.
Moreover, there were other eye witnesses to the wreck who
did testify for the insured, suggesting that the insurer had
not necessarily been substantially prejudiced by the driver's
absence.
A second case involving the insured's duties, Gunnels v.
American Liberty Insurance Co.,' 30 was concerned with the
127. The trial judge's instruction would seem to be doubtful. Although
the driver was within the control of the insured and his absence was to
a certain extent unexplained, under the circumstances there could have
been no justified suspicion that the defense was wilfully withholding thedriver's testimony. See Davis v. Sparks, 235 S.C. 326, 111 S.E.2d 545
(1959). Indeed, the court's holding in the principal case, 250 S.C. at 73,
156 S.E.2d at 631, that the jury could find the insured had "acted reason-
ably and in good faith in attempting to have the driver present to testify"
would seem to be inconsistent with such an instruction under the rationale
of Dav* supra.
128. See generally Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1146 (1958).
129. Brief for Appellant at 17-22.
130. 161 S.E.2d 822 (S.C. 1968).
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requirement of the uninsured motorist statute that the tort
plaintiff serve his liability carrier with the suit papers so
that the carrier might defend the uninsured motorist and pro-
tect itself from liability under the required uninsured motorist
endorsement.1' 1 In Gunnels the court held that under the
circumstances compliance with the statute was not a con-
dition precedent to the insured's liability under its uninsured
motorist endorsement.
Gunnels brought suit against Hewitt, who was insured by
Republic Casualty Company. Although American, who was
Gunnels' insurer, had received no suit papers, it had been
notified of the accident which gave rise to the tort suit, and
when Hewitt counterclaimed, it participated in the successful
defense against the counterclaim. Gunnels recovered in the
suit, but before the judgment could be collected, Republic
became insolvent and went into receivership. At this time
Hewitt became an uninsured motorist under section 46-750.31
of the South Carolina Code.'
3 2
Gunnels then sought to recover the tort judgment from
American under its uninsured motorist endorsement; Ameri-
can denied liability, and the present suit followed. American
demurred to the complaint on the grounds that it had never
been sent the suit papers during the tort action as specifically
required by section 46-750.33. The lower court overruled
the demurrer and American appealed. The supreme court
affirmed.
On appeal American contended that the statute requiring
suit papers to be served was unambiguous so that it was
not open to construction. The court held, however, that
since the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was re-
medial in nature, the various provisions should be applied
liberally with a view toward effectuating the overall purpose
131. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1967) provides:
No action shall be brought under the uninsured motorist pro-
vision unless copies of the pleadings in the action establishing
such liability are served in the manner provided by law upon
the insurance carrier writing such uninsured motorist provi-
sion. The insurance carrier shall have the right to appear and
defend in the name of the uninsured motorist in any action
which may affect its liability, and shall have twenty days after
service of process on it in which to make such appearance.
132. A defendant becomes an uninsured motorist if his liability carrier
becomes insolvent before it is able to respond to a judgment. S.C. CODE
ANN. § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1967).
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of the legislation. The court felt that relieving American of
liability under the present circumstances would tend to de-
feat the purpose of the required uninsured motorist endorse-
ment of protecting against damages caused by the negligence
of an uninsured motorist.
183
Under the particular facts of the case, the insurer did
have notice of the tort suit and was actually present through
its attorney. The insured was in no better a position to
know that the tort defendant might become an uninsured
motorist than was the insurer. In such a situation the re-
quirement of forwarding suit papers would be a meaning-
less technicality. The case might have been decided dif-
ferently, however, had the tort plaintiff's insurer not been
present at trial. If this were the situation the insurer would
certainly have been prejudiced by not having received the
suit papers even though the tort defendant did not become an
uninsured motorist until after trial. Unlike the present case
the insurer would be in no position to determine whether or
not it wished to participate on behalf of the tort defendant.
It would thus seem advisable for plaintiffs' attorneys to make
a practice of sending pleadings to their client's liability in-
surer when feasible, especially if the defendant's liability in-
surer is in any financial difficulty.
ROBERT M. EARLE
133. For cases decided prior to the enactment of 46-750.33 involving a
policy provision which required that suit papers be forwarded to the
uninsured motorist carrier, see Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co.,
247 S.C. 58, 145 S.E.2d 673 (1965); Hatchett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964). The rationale in Squires, supra, is
very similar to that in the principal case.
[Vol. 20
43
Earle: Insurance
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
